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Structural stability regardless of membership turnover?  
The added value of blockmodelling in the analysis of network evolution  
 
 
Abstract 
 
The extent to which the emergent structure of an organization remains the same, regardless of 
the turnover of the members is one of the most interesting questions raised by the analyses of 
their evolution. This paper uses longitudinal network analysis to provide an answer to this 
question. Its shows the usefulness of combining both dynamics and comparative statics (here, 
blockmodelling) in the study of this evolution. An empirical study examines the evolution of 
the structure of the advice network among judges of the Commercial Court in Paris. The 
combination of dynamics and comparative statics answers the initial question: Radical 
structuralism turns out to be wrong. An answer depends on the dimensions of the structure on 
which observers focus. The pecking order in the advice network remains relatively stable, 
regardless of members’ turnover. However, social differentiation measured in terms of role 
relationships and division of work shows that the relational structure does not remain the 
same regardless of members’ turnover. Specifically, relational processes within the 
organization, such as collective learning, impose varying constraints on different kinds of 
members over time and the overall relational structure reflects these members’ changing 
reactions and responses to these constraints. Since the former vary, so do the latter, and so 
does the resulting emergent overall structure. 
 
Keywords: Network dynamics, advice networks, comparative statics, membership turnover, 
relational turnover, blockmodelling 
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Structural stability regardless of membership turnover? 
The added value of blockmodelling in the analysis of network evolution  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The extent to which the emergent relational structure in an organization remains the 
same, regardless of the turnover of its members is one of the most interesting questions raised 
by structural analyses applied in organized settings. This kind of question can be addressed by 
the analysis of the evolution of the social networks in an organization. In terms of network 
analysis, the evolution of the network can be studied at least in two ways: dynamics proper, 
and comparative statics. Dynamic analyses look at the endogenous and exogenous effects 
driving changes in relationships (i.e. relational turnover) at the local, i.e. dyadic, triadic or 
sometimes higher order level sub-structures (Snijders, 2001, 2005). From significant effects at 
the local level, such analyses infer characteristics of changes at the global level; such 
inferences are sometimes quite speculative. Comparative statics captures the extent to which 
the overall, global relational structure of the organization changes over time; the speculative 
dimension of this approach is in explanations of why such changes have occurred, i.e. 
identification of social processes driving the evolution of the overall structure. Our purpose in 
this paper is to show that both dynamics and comparative statics are needed to address the 
issue of the extent to which the emergent relational structure in an organization remains the 
same, regardless of the turnover of its members.   
This research paper addresses this issue by showing the usefulness of combining the 
two approaches. We rely on previously published dynamic analyses of the evolution of an 
intra-organizational social network and provide comparative statics at the structural level by 
analyzing the evolution of the same network in an organization in which the turnover of 
members is close to 60 percent over six years. We do this using a stochastic blockmodelling 
approach developed by Snijders and Nowicki (1997). In our view, blockmodelling  identifies 
and tests at the structural level the outcome of relational processes that must be previously 
examined at the sub-structural level with different methods that tease out the determinants and 
effects of relational turnover in the network. Both methods are indispensible together to make 
the most of repeated (longitudinal) network data and its use to bridge the sub-structural (actor-
oriented) and structural (collective-oriented) levels of analysis.  
The site of our empirical study is the Commercial Court in Paris. We analyze the 
structure of the advice network among the judges of this court, the network was observed at 
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three points in time. We first summarize the processes that were reconstituted by previously 
carried out dynamic analyses, mainly a cyclical centralization–decentralization process. We 
then present the ‘best’ possible, i.e. clearest, blockmodel for each measurement of the 
network. The first wave shows three blocks, presenting a clear core–semi-periphery–
periphery structure. The core block includes the most central actors in the network, i.e. judges 
who are presidents of chamber in all three waves. Over time the overall structure changes. 
The second wave shows four blocks with the semi-periphery subdivided into two semi-
peripheries. The third wave divides the network into two blocks, back to a simpler core–
periphery structure, but with an expanded core.  
This view of the evolution of the structure confirms the existence of a relatively stable 
hierarchical pecking-order of judges in the courthouse, but also that of the cyclical process of 
centralization–decentralization of the advice network. This view also shows the usefulness of 
combining the dynamics and comparative statics in the study of network evolution. The 
combination of the two approaches answers the initial question, i.e. whether the emergent 
structure of an organization remains the same, regardless of relational turnover: Radical 
structuralism turns out to be wrong. An answer depends on the dimensions of the structure on 
which observers focus. The pecking order in itself remains relatively stable, regardless of 
members’ turnover. However, social differentiation measured in terms of role relationships 
and division of work shows that the relational structure does not remain the same regardless 
of members’ turnover. Specifically, relational processes within the organization, such as 
collective learning, impose varying constraints on different kinds of members over time and 
the overall relational structure reflects these members’ changing reactions and responses to 
these constraints. Since the former vary, so do the latter, and so does the resulting emergent 
overall structure.      
 
 
Between overload and conflict: dynamics of advice networks 
 
Static analysis of advice networks 
 
We begin by summarizing our knowledge about advice networks. An advice network 
represents a set of paths through which appropriate information circulates among members of 
an organized setting (Lazega, 1992). The allocation of this resource through informal ties and 
interactions reduces the costs of its acquisition during the process of making decisions to 
solve problems. Members of organizations see expertise and experience as accumulated by 
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the organization, and they rely constantly on advice from others. However, intra-
organizational learning through advice seeking does not simply result from the accumulation 
of individually and informally acquired information. The process is socially organized in a 
sophisticated way. 
In organizations examined by researchers, advice seeking usually converges towards 
senior and recognized members with status (Blau, 1964). It reflects a process of cognitive 
alignment on such members who gained the “authority to know”, who provide social approval 
for specific decisions, and who contribute to the integration of the organization because they 
link the individual, group and organizational levels. We think of this alignment as a key 
ingredient of intra-organizational learning (Lazega et al., 2008). A status hierarchy provides a 
social incentive for actors to share their knowledge and experience with others, thus helping 
in explaining the social organization of the learning process. 1 
Because advice networks are shaped by such status games, they are usually highly 
centralized. They exhibit a pecking order that often closely follows the hierarchical structure 
of the organization2. Members of formal organizations rarely declare that they seek advice 
from “people below” in this pecking order. In addition to the existence of a core set of central 
advisors, the periphery of the network can be complex and characterized by homophilous 
(Lazega and Van Duijn, 1997; McPherson et al., 2001) horizontal ties (i.e. ties among peers). 
Members use such ties to mitigate the potentially negative effects of this strong rule for intra-
organizational action and learning (negative effects resulting, for example, from not being 
willing to show that one does not know). Thus advice networks tend to be both hierarchical 
and cohesive (at least within subsets of peers), with the hierarchical dimension usually 
stronger than the cohesive one. In some firms, advice ties are so important that they also play 
an important role in facilitating the flows of other kinds of resources in co-work and 
friendship ties (Lazega and Pattison, 1999; Skerlavaj and Dimovski, 2006).  
 
The generation of a cyclical process 
 
A first, static look at the structure of advice networks thus shows the existence of a 
pecking order reflecting cognitive status games and cognitive status competition among 
members. To further explore the link between advice networks and intra-organizational 
learning, it is important to focus on the temporal and dynamic dimension of this process 
(Crossan et al., 1999; Bapuji and Crossan, 2004; Easterby-Smith et al., 2000). Learning 
occurs over time and across levels, if only because members can ‘unlearn’ and because they 
must combine what they already know to new knowledge that they build in order to make 
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new decisions. Stable, unchanging advice networks reduce the cost of acquiring timely 
information, but also increase the risk of acquiring obsolete and inappropriate information. 
The quality of intra-organizational learning thus depends on changes in these networks. 
Previous work on the evolution of advice networks has shown that this evolution is 
characterized by at least two interrelated processes.  
First, the number of members with cognitive status varies over time. We can think of 
several reasons for which this number oscillates, i.e. increases and decreases over time. One 
reason is that members tend to choose advisors that they perceive to be the most popular (i.e. 
already chosen by a large number of colleagues). Members sought out by many other 
members tend to build a reputation; selecting them is perceived to be safe and legitimate. As 
stressed by a micro-political perspective, everyone seeks status and believes that they will 
reach a higher status; access to advisors higher up in the ladder becomes in itself a sign of 
relative status. This implies that a member highly sought out in time t1 becomes even more 
intensively sought out in time t2 (Lazega et al., 2006).  
Second, this behavior creates an overload of requests for advice from a small number 
of highly central advisors with high cognitive status. Highly sought out advisors often manage 
this overload by delegating, i.e. referring the advice seeker to other advisors.3 This 
management of overload threatens the stability of the pecking order in the sense that it brings 
in new central advisors and requires coordination among the elites in order to avoid 
destructive status competition and conflicts of definition of the situation between “too many 
chefs” (Lazega, 2001). In turn, this strategy triggers either formal efforts of coordination 
among the elites or a new reduction in the number of advisors with high cognitive status 
through withdrawal of central advisors who become unavailable (due to retirement or 
delegitimation). This oscillation threatens the stability of the pecking order, with both positive 
and negative effects on intra-organizational learning.  
These are not simple processes. Centralization of advice networks can either remain 
stable, or increase over time, or decrease over time to reach a balance between elite overload 
and conflicts of interpretation among them.  
Thus, although previous work has shown that there is always a pecking order in advice 
networks, the pecking order is not necessarily stable over time. Stability of the pecking order 
is not automatic; it is fragile and threatened, over time, by expansion, turnover, or conflicts 
among the elite themselves. Centralization of advice networks oscillates, i.e. increases and 
decreases over time as members of the elite of advisors either leave (and are “replaced” by 
new members) or try to reach a balance between high individual status and overload on the 
one hand, and consensus on the definition of the situation on the other hand. Periods of 
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centralization of advice networks are followed by periods of decline in this centralization, 
then by periods of recentralization.   
 Evidence for these processes has been provided by dynamic analyses explaining 
relational turnover at the local level (Lazega et al., 2006). In this paper, we provide further 
knowledge about this process by looking at its outcome at the structural level, i.e. by 
examining blockmodels of these networks. Thus we predict that the structure of the advice 
network provided by blockmodelling  should be more centralized at time t2 than at time t1 of 
the evolution of this network, and that the blockmodel of this network at time t3 should reflect 
a less centralized structure. This shows that depending on the stage at which observers 
measure the network, the structure of the following networks will be different. Thus, we 
expect that the relational structure does not remain the same regardless of membership 
turnover. 
In order to test this hypothesis and illustrate the usefulness of a combined dynamic and 
comparative statics approach in the study of the evolution of intra-organizational advice 
networks, we provide a case study of the evolution of the advice network in a first-level 
judicial organization, the Commercial Court of Paris (CCP). 
 
 
A case study: the evolution of the advice network among judges  
 
In this court, the judges perform tasks are that multifaceted and that require multiple 
skills, for example legal, economic, and managerial. Further, conflict resolution often depends 
on detailed knowledge of the business and specific industry in which the conflict takes place. 
In order to cope with such needs for specific knowledge, judges tap into the expertise and 
experience of their very diverse set of colleagues, by seeking each other for advice intensely.  
We collected data of interest at the Commercial Court of Paris to test? the argument of 
this paper at three points in time (fall 2000, fall 2002, and fall 2005). We interviewed judges 
at this courthouse about their advice ties to one another and we were therefore able to 
reconstitute, at each point in time, the complete network of advice ties among the judges.4 
To obtain the advice network of the judges the following name generator was used: 
“Here is the list of all your colleagues at this Tribunal, including the President and Vice-
Presidents of the Tribunal, the Presidents of the Chambers, the judges, and ‘wise-men’. Using 
this list, could you check the names of colleagues to whom you have asked advice during the 
last two years concerning a complex case, or with whom you have had basic discussions, 
outside formal deliberations, in order to get a different point of view on this case.” An 
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extensive report on the data gathering and a more in-depth description of the organization of 
the CCP can be found in Lazega and Mounier (2003).  
 The first wave contains 147 actors, wave 2 contains 156 actors, and the last wave 
contains 151 actors. The density of the network increases over time, indicating that judges 
seek more advice from each other over time. In wave 1, the density is 0.03, and in wave 2 and 
3 the density is 0.05. The average density over the three waves is 0.04. The simple plots in 
Figure 1 show high correlations between indegree centralities of the members in the first 
period (wave 1 and 2) and in the second (wave 2 and 3), which shows that the pecking order 
is only relatively stable, as predicted. Correlations are respectively 0.9 and 0.7.   
 
 
-Figure 1 about here- 
 
 
Dynamics: centralization and decentralization process 
 
Previous work (Lazega et al., 2006) shows that the difference between the two plots 
actually indicates that centralization of the advice network increases then decreases over time, 
as members with cognitive status try to avoid overload at the risk of accepting conflicts with 
other elite advisors. The existence of this oscillation was established using dynamic analyses 
of the evolution of this network. Table 1 provides a dynamic analysis of the evolution of this 
network, adapted from our previous work in which we look at the dynamics of advice 
networks as an oscillation in the centralization of the network. In other words this 
centralization increases then decreases over time as members with cognitive status try to 
avoid overload at the risk of accepting conflicts of definition of the situation. Dynamic 
analyses allowed us to test for the existence of this oscillation. This meant looking more 
closely at the structural factors that explain relational turnover in the network, i.e. the creation 
of new ties and the dropping of previously existing ones.  
Statistical confirmation for this process is provided by ‘actor-oriented’ network 
models developed by Snijders et al. (2001, 2004, 2005). The analyses were done by means of 
SIENA software, available in the StOCNET package (Boer et al., 2006), which is specifically 
designed to model the evolution of networks over time. The model specification strategy 
included testing each independent variable on its own and providing a final model that was 
estimated by including only the significant parameters –with one exception– from the 
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previous models. Table 1 presents the best (most parsimonious) SIENA models achieved with 
this dataset.  
 
-Table 1 about here- 
 
These tests confirm that judges show a preference for advice seeking from advisors 
who are already sought out for advice by others: the ‘Popularity of alter’ effect is strong. 
During the first period, as shown by a strong ‘Activity of alter’ effect, they do not seek out 
advice from other judges who themselves seek out advice frequently. As suggested in our 
descriptive claims, senior judges –who are already central– become even more central. 
Increasing centrality of already central judges is the main effect produced by the formal 
dynamic force behind relational turnover in this organization between 2000 and 2002.  
Although smaller by comparison with popularity and activity of alter effects, effects 
captured by a few structural variables are also significant. Reciprocal and transitive 
relationships also drive relational changes in the advice network in the first period. Judges 
seek out as advisors members to whom they previously gave advice directly; they also seek 
out advisors of their advisors. This trend suggests that new ties are established within social 
sub-groups already identified by actors, reinforcing homophilous evolution. 3-cycles within 
such groups are associated with a negative parameter, suggesting that generalized exchange is 
unlikely over time in this fairly hierarchical network. One can also observe that there is a limit 
to the number of advisors that each judge can seek (a “ceiling effect” in advice seeking, for 
example for fear of looking incompetent), and that within this limit the concentration of new 
demands on those who were already important advisors is confirmed. These effects are 
consistent with Blau’s social exchange theory of advice for status (Blau, 1964). 
The second model of Table 1, measuring the evolution of the network for the second 
period of the study, captures the oscillation between increasing and decreasing centralization 
of the advice network. In effect, the relational turnover between wave 1 (in 2000) and wave 2 
(in 2002) accounted for a phase of increasing centralization. In turn, the subsequent relational 
turnover between wave 2 (in 2002) and wave 3 (in 2005) accounts for a decreasing 
centralization of the network. The ‘Popularity of alter’ parameter remains strong: central 
members still attract new demands for advice and the more central they are the more central 
they tend to become. However, the fact that a judge seeks advice frequently no longer 
prevents (during the second period) other judges from seeking advice from him/her: the 
‘Activity of alter’ parameter is no longer significant in the second period. This second effect, 
combined with the first effect and with the drop in the correlation between indegree centrality 
Structural stability and membership turnover 
Lazega, Sapulete & Mounier 2009 
 10
in wave 2 and indegree centrality in wave 3, indicates a downward tendency in the second 
period that did not exist during the first period: many central members lose some of their 
centrality in this downturn and, as a result, new members become more central than they were 
before, thus joining this elite of judges with cognitive status.  
These results show very clearly that intra-organizational learning, as an informal 
process, depends on three factors at least. First, the way in which members manage their 
advice ties in the context of this formal organization. Second, the ways in which central 
advisors handle overload and conflicts of definition of the situation. Third, the ways in which 
formal structure can help in dealing with this oscillation of centralization and decentralization 
of the advice network. In effect, changing levels of centralization over time suggest that this 
oscillation can weaken collective learning as driven by formal structure. 
  
 
Comparative statics: the outcomes at the structural level 
 
As outlined above, we now use comparative statics based on blockmodelling to look at 
the outcome of this dynamic process at the structural level. This provides an illustration of the 
usefulness of blockmodelling in the study of network evolution. Blockmodelling  identifies 
and tests at the structural level the outcome of relational processes (influence and selection) 
examined at the sub-structural level with methods that examine the determinants and effects 
of relational turnover in the network. We argue that both methods are indispensible together 
to make the most of repeated (longitudinal) network data and its use to bridge the sub-
structural (actor-oriented) and structural (collective oriented) levels of analysis.  
The blockmodelling approach used here was developed by Snijders and Nowicki 
(1997) and implemented in software called BLOCKS. Our empirical case examines the 
overall structure of the advice network among the judges of the same court as above, at each 
of the three points in time. BLOCKS helps find the ‘best’ possible, i.e. clearest, blockmodel 
for each measurement of the network.  
 
Stochastic equivalence in BLOCKS 
 
Since the early beginning of social network analysis, positions and roles have played 
an important part in this field. Blockmodelling  is a useful way to obtain clusters of 
structurally equivalent actors in a network. Blockmodelling  was introduced by White, 
Boorman, and Breiger (1976). Criteria to examine whether actors are equivalent or not from a 
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relational perspective are for example structural equivalence, regular equivalence and 
stochastic equivalence. This study uses the criterion of stochastic equivalence to examine the 
positions of the actors. Stochastically equivalent actors have the same probability distribution 
of their relations to other classes of actors (Snijders & Nowicki, 2004). Stochastic equivalence 
considers latent classes, meaning that the data have an underlying class structure of 
equivalence classes. Stochastic blockmodelling  assumes latent blocks, meaning that the 
network is treated as an observation of a latent partition that is affected by measurement error. 
The process of stochastic blockmodelling  tries to identify the right class structure, the right 
partition into blocks. The groups that are identified by the criteria for equivalence are referred 
to as positions or blocks. We will refer to the identified clusters as blocks.  
BLOCKS (version 1.8; Snijders & Nowicki, 1997; Nowicki & Snijders, 2001; Snijders 
& Nowicki, 2004) is a program for stochastic blockmodelling , implemented in StOCNET 
(Boer et al., 2006). Stochastic blockmodelling  assumes latent blocks, meaning that the 
network is treated as an observation of a latent partition, that is affected by measurement 
error.  
 The dyad is the basic relational unit in BLOCKS. Therefore, the data need to be 
recoded in a so-called ‘new alphabet’: Symmetric relations are coded 1 when there is no 
relation and 2 when there is a relation. Asymmetric relations receive the value 3 for relations 
from actor i to j, and a value 4 for a relation from actor j to i. BLOCKS uses a random 
simulation method to find the blocks, namely Gibbs sampling (see for more information 
Gelfand (2000) and Casella and George (1992)). A Gibbs sequence leads to convergence at a 
certain point, after which an after convergence run is carried out, in which the posterior means 
are calculated. It is not certain after how many iterations a sequence reaches convergence. 
Snijders and Nowicki (2004) propose to choose the default value of 10,000 for the before and 
after convergence phase. Because Gibbs sampling is a random simulation method, the results 
will be different every time one runs an analysis. Therefore, it is best to perform two or three 
Gibbs sequences to compare the results and decide upon the best blockmodel. If the Gibbs 
sequences give approximately the same results, the results can be considered reliable.  
 Since no partition is known beforehand, a decision has to be made about the number of 
blocks. The best way to do this is to ask for a different number of blocks, for example two to 
five blocks. BLOCKS will provide three Gibbs sequences for each number of blocks (so if 
you asked for two to five, the output contains twelve blockmodels). Choosing the best block 
is “a matter of fit and interpretability” (Snijders & Nowicki, 2004, p. 7). As fit statistics, an 
information parameter (Iy) and a clarity parameter (Hx) are provided. Both need to be close to 
zero for good model fit, with the latter of more importance than the former. A zero value for 
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the information parameter indicates that the relation between the vertices is determined by the 
classes in which they are. The clarity parameter indicates whether or not there is a clear block 
structure. The model with the lowest fit parameters shows the clearest block structure and 
thus is the best to choose for interpretation. There is no threshold value to indicate when a 
model is acceptable or not. To decide whether the model can be accepted or not, the fit 
parameters must show similar values. The best model can be chosen from several models by 
looking at which model shows the lowest fit parameters5.  
   An extensive description of the output and its interpretation can be found in the 
manual of BLOCKS (Snijders & Nowicki, 2004). The information parameter is presented, 
together with the new partition. After the reordered matrix, the clarity parameter is provided. 
In the section ‘Finding strictly separated classes’, vertices that do not fit into the model are 
“thrown out”. If the model still does not fit well enough, this process is repeated a second 
time. The “thrown out” actors are put together in a null block, and their relations to both other 
classes are given at the end of the output. Furthermore, the actors that are thrown out might 
not fit optimally in a block regarding their equivalence, but they fit in terms of other 
attributes, which are shown in the analyses. This measure is much weaker than the 
information and clarity parameter. Therefore, we choose to leave the ‘outliers’ in the initial 
partition in the following analyses, meaning that we choose not to leave actors out of the 
analyses. The measures of fit given in the output correspond to the initial partition, and they 
are acceptable given the criteria mentioned above.  
   
Successive outcomes of the cyclical process 
 
Applied to Wave 1 data, BLOCKS divides the data in three blocks consisting of 4, 67, 
and 60 actors, respectively. The model fit is good (0.23 for the Iy and 0.18 for the Hx), at least 
better than that of the analysis with a division into two blocks (0.25 and 0.25 respectively). 
The model fit for a model with four blocks was less good than the model with three blocks (Iy 
was 0.22 and Hx was 0.30).  
The density within the overall network and within the blocks is used to generate an 
image matrix from the data. An image matrix is a simplification of the blocked matrix, in 
which the rows and columns refer to positions in case of individual actors (Wasserman & 
Faust, 1994). The blocks, filled with a 1 or a 0, are called oneblocks or zeroblocks. Because 
actors are almost never perfectly structurally equivalent, blockmodelling  searches for 
approximately structurally equivalent actors (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Using a threshold 
value is a good way to define the positions, since searching for complete one or zeroblocks is 
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difficult and most often too strict. A threshold value often used is the average density in the 
network; values below this average become zeroblocks, values above this average become 
oneblocks. 
 
-Figures 2a and 2b about here- 
 
Figure 2a shows the reduced graph6 of the relations between the positions and their 
probabilities of having a tie to each other. Block 1 is referred to as the core, block 2 the semi-
periphery, and block 3 the periphery. The core receives most requests for advice from the 
periphery, the semi-periphery, and from itself; average indegree centrality of its super-central 
members is 33. The core seeks advice from semi-periphery and periphery, but much lower 
probability than to its own members. Average indegree centrality of semi-periphery members 
is 3.82; for periphery members this value is 2.58. 
The actors within the core seek advice from all other blocks. The same holds for the 
periphery. The semi-periphery only seeks the core for advice, and is sought out by the core 
and periphery. The periphery is sought out by the core and by members of its own block. The 
core is sought out for advice by all other blocks. Members in the core are characterized by 
high indegree centrality and share attributes such as status of being president of chamber in 
the court.   
The solid lines in figure 2a indicate that there is a tie defined by the image matrix, 
whereas the dotted lines refer to zeros in the image matrix. The probabilities therefore clarify 
the relations between and within the blocks, and indicate the probability with which members 
of a group ask members of another group (e.g. Flandreau & Jobst, 2005). 
Applied to Wave 2 data, BLOCKS divides the network into four blocks, as shown in 
Figures 3a and 3b, with an information parameter of 0.31, and a clarity parameter of 0.11. 
These measures of fit are lower than those of the blockmodel of three blocks and than that of 
two blocks, indicating that this model is better. The blocks consist of 83, 42, 28, and 3 actors, 
respectively. The core block consists of three actors, who are most central, most senior, and 
more often presidents of chamber. The second block (the 1st semi-periphery) consists of actors 
who work in the service sector, and a number of presidents of chamber. The third block (2nd 
semi-periphery) has the highest outdegree and the periphery is the most punitive.  
 
-Figures 3a and 3b about here- 
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The density in the network is 0.05. Figure 3a shows the reduced graph of the relations 
between the positions and their probabilities of having a tie to each other. On the basis of their 
position in the network the labels are defined: the 1st and 2nd semi-periphery are both in 
between the core and the periphery. In the core, average indegree centrality of its super-
central members increases to 56.33. The number of core members is still the same but their 
average centrality has increased. Average indegree centrality of the members of the first semi-
periphery is now 14.62; for the second semi-periphery members this value is 8.71; for 
periphery members, it is 2,69. As expected, this shows a more centralized structure than that 
reconstituted in Figures 2a and 2b. 
 Applied to Wave 3 data, BLOCKS divides the data into two blocks of N= 134, and N= 
17, as shown in Figures 4a and 4b, with a clear core and periphery structure. The model fit is 
good, an information parameter of 0.36, and a clarity parameter very close to zero (0.04). The 
overall density is 0.05 (5.17 percent) The periphery is not sought out for advice by any of the 
other groups. The core is sought out by both blocks. In the core, average indegree centrality of 
its super-central members decreases to 30.12. Average indegree centrality of the members of 
the periphery is now 4.93. 
 
-Figures 4a and 4b about here- 
 
The core consists again of the most central actors. Further, actors in the core more 
often work in the bank and finance sector with a law degree, are more senior, are often 
president of chamber and possess a law degree. The periphery contains most actors working 
in the bank and finance sector, without a law degree. The periphery has a high outdegree, but 
the core itself has a high outdegree as well. The core seeks advice within the own block, and 
the periphery seeks advice from the core. Figure 4a shows the reduced graph. 
In sum, the first wave shows three blocks, presenting a clear core-semi-periphery-
periphery structure. The core block includes the most central actors in the network, i.e. 
members who are presidents of chamber in all three waves. Over time the structure changes. 
The second wave shows four blocks with the semi-periphery subdivided into two semi-
peripheries, and the third wave divides the network into two blocks, back to a simpler core-
periphery structure, but with an expanded core. This structure confirms the existence of a 
hierarchical pecking-order in the organization. 
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Relative structural stability regardless of membership turnover 
 
This analysis shows an evolution of the overall structure from three to four to two 
positions. It confirms our expectations based on the cyclical process characterizing the 
evolution of the advice network. The four-position structure of the second wave shows a more 
centralized structure (with more members in the core than in the previous measurement), 
although more fragmented, than the initial three-position structure. The picture of the two-
position structure of the third wave shows a less centralized structure (although less 
fragmented) than the previous three-position or four-position structures: there are many more 
central members in the core block). Increased centralization with fewer members in the core 
also means higher fragmentation. As illustrated by the figures, this is confirmed by the fact 
that the core in the third structure contains more members than the core in the first two 
structures.  
This analysis shows the added value of comparative statics based on blockmodelling, 
i.e. the usefulness of computing and visualizing, at each stage of the evolution of the network, 
the outcome of the underlying relational turnover using positional analysis. Verification of the 
overlap in the composition of Wave 1, 2 and 3 block members over time shows that the 
structure does remain stable to some extent over time, but that this stability is quite relative to 
the moment of the underlying process (driving the evolution of the structure) at which the 
observer looks at this structure. 
Table 2 shows that none of the three blocks in wave 1 neatly disintegrates into two 
separate blocks. In the period from wave 1 to wave 2 the block structure changes; the number 
of blocks changes, and the composition as well. The only group that stays rather stable over 
time is the core. The only group that shows a clear result is the elite. Two of the three elite 
judges in wave 1 are in the elite in wave 2. A new actor climbed up to the core group between 
the two measurements. Another judge, who was in the core in wave 1, moved “down” the 
pecking order to the 1st semi-periphery in wave 2.  
 
-Table 2 about here- 
 
Since the number of judges and the actors in the data differ over time, it is not striking 
that the composition of the blocks changes. Among newcomers (actors who were not present 
in wave 1, but are newcomers in wave 2), for example, 93 percent cluster together in the 
periphery in wave 2. This means that almost all newcomers seek advice from the same group 
of elite judges. Among the newcomers, three actors (7 percent) can be found in the 2nd semi-
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periphery. None of the newcomers end up in the elite core. As seen in the dynamics analysis, 
the more junior the judges the less they are sought out for advice.  
 Table 3 shows that, in the change from wave 2 to wave 3, the judges from the 1st semi-
periphery end up mostly in the periphery, but a large share of these judges (65 percent), 
compared to the other blocks, ends up in the core group. Furthermore, all actors who were in 
the core block in wave 2, are in the core in wave 3.  
 
-Table 3 about here- 
 
 Thus, the blocks are not stable over time. Positions do not disintegrate and integrate 
again. The formed blocks are different in their composition, if only because there are 
newcomers in each wave. Thus, we cannot identify a strictly stable structure over time, 
regardless of who the actors in the blocks are. The only true stability comes from the 
composition of core blocks which contain actors with high seniority. From the first to the 
second wave actors who end up in the most central groups are present in both waves, and 
from the second to the third wave the core is formed by actors who have been around in all 
three waves. Looking at the evolution of the peripheral groups from wave 1 to wave 2 shows 
that a large share (42 percent) of the actors in the periphery also ends up in the periphery in 
wave 2. However, the two semi-peripheries that are found in wave 2 are not composed of the 
one in wave 1. The semi-periphery in wave 1 is for the largest part split into the periphery and 
1st semi-periphery. Both the structure and the composition of its elements at the overall level 
change over time.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Our conclusion is that the emergent relational structure in an organization does not 
remain the same, regardless of the turnover of its members. Radical structuralism is shown to 
be wrong in organized settings. Illustration is provided by comparative statics in the analysis 
of the evolution of network structure over time. We use blockmodelling  to identify and test at 
the structural level the outcome of endogenous relational processes previously examined at 
the sub-structural level. Results confirm our cyclical model for the evolution of the advice 
network in an organization, the Commercial Court of Paris. The centrality scores of members 
with cognitive status increase, then tend to decrease over time. The composition of the core 
block changes, and the number of members in it increases after a period of centralization of 
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the network. In sum, the underlying social process, collective learning through networks, is 
driven by relational turnover, centralization then decentralization of the advice network, 
strategies of stabilization and creation of consensus among the elite, and the central place of a 
subgroup of senior actors. Both dynamics and comparative statics are jointly combined to 
address the issue of the extent to which the emergent relational structure in an organization 
remains the same, regardless of the turnover of its members. The answer to the overall 
question of the stability of the structure regardless of the turnover of its members is that it 
depends on the stage of the process driving the evolution of the structure at which observation 
takes place.  
 
 
Structural stability and membership turnover 
Lazega, Sapulete & Mounier 2009 
 18
 
Acknowledgments 
 
We would like to thank Germain Barré, Marijtje van Duijn, Frédéric Godart, Gijs Huitsing, 
Anke Munniksma, Tom Snijders, and Christian Steglich for help and advice. 
 
 
References  
 
Bapuji, Hari, Crossan, Mary M. 2004. "From Questions to Answers: Reviewing 
Organizational Learning Research". Management Learning, 35:397-417. 
Blau, Peter M. 1964. Exchange and Power in Social Life. New York: John Wiley. 
Boer, P., Huisman, M., Snijders, T. A. B., Steglich, C. E. G., Wichers, L. H. Y., & Zeggelink, 
E. P. H. (2006). StOCNET: An open software system for the advanced statistical 
analysis of social networks (Version 1.7). Groningen: ICS / SciencePlus. 
Borgatti, Stephen P. and Cross, Rob. 2003. "A Relational View of Information Seeking and 
Learning in Social Networks". Management Science, 49:432-45. 
Brass, Daniel J. 1984. "Being in the Right Place: A Structural Analysis of Individual 
Influence in an Organization". Administrative Science Quarterly, 29:518-539. 
Casella, G., & George, E.I. (1992). Explaining the Gibbs sampler. The American Statistician, 
46, 167-174. 
Cross, Rob, Borgatti, Stephen P., Parker, Andrew. 2001. "Beyond answers: dimensions of the 
advice network". Social Networks, 23: 215–235. 
Crossan, Mary M., Lane, Henry W., and White, Roderick E. 1999. "An Organizational 
Learning Framework; From Intuition to Institution". Academy of Management Review, 
24:522-37. 
Easterby-Smith, Mark, Crossan, Mary and Nicolini, Davide. 2000. "Organizational Learning: 
Debates Past, Present and Future". Journal of Management Studies, 37: 783-96. 
Flandreau, M., & Jobst, C. (2005). The ties that divide: A network analysis of the 
international monetary system, 1890-1910. The Journal of Economic History, 65, 977-
1007).  
Gelfand, A.E. (2000). Gibbs sampling. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 95, 
1300-1304.  
Kilduff, Martin and Tsai, Wenpin. 2003. Social networks and organizations. Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage. 
Structural stability and membership turnover 
Lazega, Sapulete & Mounier 2009 
 19
Krackhardt, David. 1987. "Cognitive Social Structures". Social Networks, 9 :109-134. 
Krackhardt, David. 1990. "Assessing the Political Landscape: Structure, Cognition, and 
Power in Organizations". Administrative Science Quarterly, 35:342-369.  
Lazega, Emmanuel (1992), Micropolitics of Knowledge: Communication and Indirect 
Control in Workgroups, New York, Aldine-de Gruyter. 
Lazega, Emmanuel (1995), "Concurrence, coopération et flux de conseil dans un cabinet 
américain d'avocats d'affaires: Les échanges d'idées entre collègues", Revue Suisse de 
Sociologie, 21:61-85. 
Lazega, Emmanuel (2001), The Collegial Phenomenon: The Social Mechanisms of 
Cooperation Among Peers in a Corporate Law Partnership, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press  
Lazega, Emmanuel and Van Duijn, Marijtje (1997), "Position in formal structure, personal 
characteristics and choices of advisors in a law firm: A logistic regression model for 
dyadic network data", Social Networks, 19:375-397. 
Lazega, Emmanuel and Pattison, Philippa (1999), "Multiplexity, Generalized Exchange and 
Cooperation in Organizations", Social Networks, 21:67-90. 
Lazega, Emmanuel and Mounier, Lise (2003), "Interlocking Judges: On Joint External and 
Self-Governance of Markets", in Vincent Buskens, Werner Raub and Chris Snijders 
(eds), Research in the Sociology of Organizations, 20: 267-296, Elsevier. 
Lazega, Emmanuel, Lemercier, Claire et Mounier Lise (2006), "A spinning top model of 
formal structure and informal behaviour: Dynamics of advice networks in a 
commercial court", European Management Review, 3:113-122 
Lazega, Emmanuel, Lise Mounier, Tom Snijders et Paola Tubaro (2008), "Réseaux et 
controverses: De l’effet des normes sur la dynamique des structures", Revue 
française de sociologie, 49 : 467-498 
McDonald, Michael L. and Westphal, James D. 2003. "Getting by with the advice of their 
friends: CEOs’ advice networks and firms’ strategic responses to poor performance". 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 48: 1–32. 
McPherson, J.Miller, Smith-Lovin, Lynn and Cook, James M. 2001. "Birds of a Feather: 
Homophily in Social Networks". Annual Review of Sociology 27, 415-444.  
Nowicki, K., & Snijders, T.A.B. (2001). Estimation and prediction for stochastic 
blockstructures. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 96, 1077-1087. 
Snijders, Tom A.B. 2001. "The statistical evaluation of social network dynamics". In Michael 
E. Sobel & Mark P.Becker (eds.), Sociological Methodology, pages 361-395. 
London: Basil Blackwell. 
Structural stability and membership turnover 
Lazega, Sapulete & Mounier 2009 
 20
Snijders, Tom A.B. 2004. "Simulation-based statistical inference for evolution of social 
networks". Paper presented at the Sunbelt conference, Slovenia.  
Snijders, Tom A.B. 2005. "Models for Longitudinal Network Data". Chapter 11 in Peter 
Carrington, John Scott and Stanley Wasserman (eds.). Models and Methods in Social 
Network Analysis. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Snijders, Tom A.B. and Huisman, Michael. 2002. Manual for SIENA version 1.95. 
Groningen: ICS/Dept. of Statistics & Measurement Theory, University of Groningen. 
SNIJDERS, T.A.B., STEGLICH, C.E.G., SCHWEINBERGER, M., HUISMAN, M. Manual for SIENA 
version 3.11. Groningen: University of Groningen, ICS. Oxford: University of Oxford, 
Department of Statistics, 2007. http://stat.gamma.rug.nl/stocnet. 
Snijders, T.A.B., & Nowicki, K. (1997). Estimation and prediction for stochastic blockmodels 
for graphs with latent block structure. Journal of Classification, 14, 75-100.  
Snijders, T.A.B., & Nowicki, K. (2004). Manual for BLOCKS version 1.6. Groningen: 
ICS/Dept. of Statistics & Measurement Theory, University of Groningen. 
Škerlavaj, Miha and Dimovski, Vlado (2006). Social network approach to organizational 
learning. Journal of Applied Business Research, 22: 89-97. 
Tsaï, Wenpin. 2002. "Social structure of coopetition within a multiunit organization: 
coordination, competition, and intra-organizational knowledge sharing". 
Organisation Science, 13:179-190. 
Tubaro, Paola, Lazega, Emmanuel and Mounier, Lise (2008), "Further explorations of the 
spinning top model for de dynamics of advice networks and collective learning", in 
Marc Lecoutre et Pascal Lièvre (eds.), Management et réseaux sociaux, Londres, 
Hermès-Lavoisier 
Wasserman, S., & Faust, K. (1994). Social network analysis: methods and applications, New 
York: Cambridge University Press.  
White, H.C., Boorman, S.A., & Breiger, R.L. (1976). Social structure from multiple networks 
I. Blockmodels of roles and positions. American Journal of Sociology, 81, 730-779.  
Structural stability and membership turnover 
Lazega, Sapulete & Mounier 2009 
 21
Table 1 Collective learning as a cyclical process: Increasing, then decreasing,  
centralization of an advice network over time 
  
 
Independent variables Parameters for 
period 1 (Wave 1-
Wave 2) 
Parameters for 
period 2 (Wave 2-
Wave 3) 
     
      Rate parameter  22.25  (2.03)  30.58  (3.14) 
      Density  -1.74  (0.09)  -2.23  (0.18) 
      Reciprocity   0.95  (0.16)   0.71  (0.13) 
      Transitivity   0.50  (0.04)   0.19  (0.01) 
      Popularity of alter   3.34  (0.40)   3.84  (0.25) 
      Activity of alter -14.44 (1.84) -1.86  (1.87) 
      3-cycles of generalized 
      Exchange 
 -0.29  (0.09)  -0.07  (0.01) 
 
 
This table presents two SIENA models analyzing the evolution, over five years, of the advice network 
among judges at the Commercial court of Paris (2000-2005). The rate parameter models the amount 
of change between two observations of the network, i.e. the speed by which the dependent variable 
changes. The ‘density’ effect accounts for the observed network density (based on the outdegree of 
each actor) and can be interpreted as an intercept. The positive reciprocity effect indicates that the 
tendency to reciprocate an advice relationship drives the evolution of the network. The positive 
transitivity effect indicates that the tendency to seek advice from one’s advisor’s advisor also drives 
the evolution of the network. The negative ‘3-cycle of generalized exchange’ effect indicates that the 
tendency to seek advice from an advisee of an advisee does not drive the evolution of the network; 
this effect shows that status differences do matter in advice seeking among judges, since they do not 
seek advice from judges “below” them in the pecking order. The ‘Popularity alter effect’ measures the 
extent to which members tend to select as advisors other members who are already sought out for 
advice, and that this tendency drives changes in the network. The strength and positive value of this 
parameter indicates that this is the main effect explaining changes in the network: central advisors 
become even more central over time. The ‘Activity of alter’ effect measures the extent to which 
members who seek out many advisors tend to be sought out themselves as advisors. The negative 
parameter means that this tendency does not drive the evolution of the network. However, this 
parameter is not significant for the second period, which indicates that during this period network 
centralization decreases. N=91 for period 1 and N=113 for period 2. Standard errors in parentheses. 
MCMC (Markov Chain Monte Carlo) estimation procedure. 
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Figure 1. A stable pecking order in the advice network among judges 
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Figure 2a Reduced graph three blocks, wave 1, with intra- and inter-block densities 
 
Figure 2b Network wave 1, 3 blocks: ‘Core’ (in red), ‘semi-periphery’ (green), and 
‘periphery’ (blue)
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Figure 3a Reduced graph, four blocks, wave 2, with intra- and inter-block densities 
 
Figure 3b Network wave 2, four blocks, ‘core’ (red), ‘first semi-periphery’ (yellow), ‘second semi-
periphery’ (green), and ‘periphery’ (blue)
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Table 2 Overlap in composition of Wave 1 block members with Wave 2 block members 
Blocks wave 2   
Periphery 1st semi-
periphery 
2nd semi-
periphery 
Core Total  
Core 0 1 0 2 3
Semi-periphery 22 29 8 1 60
Periphery 21 12 17 0 50
Blocks wave 1 
  
  
Total 43 42 25 3 113
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Overlap in composition of Wave 2 block members with Wave 3 block members 
Blocks wave 3   
Periphery Core Total  
Periphery 62 2 64
1st semi-periphery 17 11 28
2nd semi-periphery 17 2 19
Core 0 2 2
Blocks  
wave 2 
  
  
  Total 96 17 113
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 For example, social exchange and status help solve a learning dilemma in which it is rational 
for individuals to pursue the maximum organizational share of joint learning by taking more 
knowledge than they give; at the same time, the relative withholding of knowledge reduces 
the total amount of joint learning from which they attempt to appropriate their individual 
share (Larson et al., 1998)..  
2 See for example Borgatti and Cross, 2003; Brass, 1984; Cross et al., 2001; Hansen, 2002; 
Kilduff and Tsaï, 2003; Krackhardt, 1987, 1990; Lazega, 1992, 1995, 2001; McDonald and 
Westphal, 2003; Tsaï, 2002. 
3 Even when they do not delegate, the equilibrium remains fragile. As concentration of 
cognitive authority increases with centralization of the advice network, learning becomes 
dependent upon a decreasing number of sources of authoritative knowledge. As advice 
provided by this small number of sources starts becoming inaccessible or inappropriate 
(irrelevant, inaccurate, untimely), members tend to turn to other sources of advice and create 
new “stars” in the learning process. This increases the number of central advisors and reduces 
the centralization of the network until some of the old stars exit the system.  
4 The number of judges varied between 147 and 156 between 2000 and 2005, with an 87.1% 
average response rate over the three measurements. 
5 One of the advanced options worth mentioning here is the concentration parameter. The 
higher this parameter, the higher the tendency of BLOCKS to generate blocks of equal size 
(Snijders & Nowicki, 2004). The default value of the concentration parameter is 100, meaning 
that the risk to obtain groups with very few actors is diminished. However, obtaining blocks 
of for example three actors can yield very meaningful results, for instance when these three 
actors are highly central and similar in their attributes. If one does not wish equally sized 
groups, one can choose a concentration parameter of 0. 
6 Based on the density table not provided here.  
 
